Minerva
Av: Jan Arild Snoen - 12. juni, 2009  
Jeg har samlet relevant informasjon og analyser i forbindelse med dagens presidentvalg i Iran.

Dersom Ahmadinejad skulle tape, vil det trolig øke mulighetene for å vinne frem med forhandlinger i striden om landets atomprogram, og redusere sjansene for et militært angrep, slik jeg skrev om på tirsdag.
 
På Intrades prediksjonsmarked steg kursen på den moderate kandidaten Mousavi kraftig i går kveld og i natt, slik at han på morgenkvisten ble gitt en 80 prosent sjanse for å vinne. I skrivende stund er han nede i drøye 60 prosent, og dere kan følge utviklingen her. Prediksjonsmarkeder har imidlertid vist seg veldig usikre i mindre transparente samfunn der meningsmålingene er manglende eller upålitelige, så det er ingen grunn til å legge vesentlig vekt å dette.
 
Ifølge iranske eksperter The Guardian har snakket med, ligger Mousavi an til å vinne dersom det ikke fuskes.
 
Det er ventet at valgdeltakelsen blir avgjørende. Er den høy, betyr det trolig at reformtilhengerne har deltatt massivt. De holdt seg i stor grad borte i 2005 fordi de ikke syntes det var noen vits i å stemme etter at forrige president Khatami hadde fått til lite. Det vil være dårlig nytt for Amhadinejad, som antas å ha en velgerblokk som med større sikkerhet vil stemme. Dette og andre indikasjoner kan dere følge på Guardians liveblogg fra Tehran.
 
Foreløpige valgresultater er ventet lørdag formiddag. Dersom ingen kandidat får flertall, noe jeg anser sannsynlig, går de to beste videre til avgjørende runde neste fredag.
 
Klasse og elite
Thomas Erdbrink i Washington Post peker på klasseaspektet ved valgkampen. Den urbane middelklassens entusiastiske støtte til Mousavi er lett å observere for journalistene i Tehran, mens det er vanskeligere å lage gode bilder og stemningsrapporter av Amhadinejads støtte blant fattigfolk på landsbygda. (At Mousavi også har fremgang på landsbygda rapporteres her).
Ahmadinejad has turned the Iranian economy upside down, making sure that advantages flow to the lower class. His government has increased state wages and pensions and has made health insurance free for 22 million people. He derides economists who blame him for high inflation and unemployment, saying that they are tied to the higher classes and that his goal is to “spread justice.” …
 
His leading challenger is Mousavi, an urbane, soft-spoken architect who was prime minister from 1981 to 1989. Though out of power for two decades, Mousavi is in many ways the Iranian establishment`s candidate. He represents an older generation of Islamic clergy and politicians who fought side by side with the leader of the 1979 revolution, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, but whose power and positions have gradually been stripped away by Ahmadinejad and his associates.
Det hevdes ofte at presidenten ikke har noen makt, siden den ligger hos Den Øverste Leder Khamenei. Dette er delvis riktig, men som Erdbrink viser til, har Ahmadinejad endret den økonomiske politikken og sosialpolitikken betydelig. Professor Mohsen M. Milani har en mer positiv vurdering av presidentens makt her.
 
Ahmadinejad har utnyttet at Mousavi mottar sterk støtte fra tidligere president Rafsanjani, som Ahmadinejad overraskende slo i forrige valg. Rafsanjani er allment ansett som korrupt og ikke særlig populær. New York Times skrev onsdag om forbindelsen mellom Mousavi og Rafsanjani og den viktige støtten sistnevnte bidrar med.
 
Juks og fløyelserevolusjon?
Robert Dreyfuss skriver i venstreorienterte The Nation om den følelsesladede valgkampen:
There`s worry and anger about cheating and unfair campaigning. Yesterday, the state-run Iranian TV gave Ahmadinejad twenty minutes of free air time for a speech, while offering one minute each to his three rivals. …
 
But there`s an uneasy feeling that, especially if the vote is close, one side or the other won`t accept the results. Perhaps the greatest danger comes from the angry, inflamed supporters of Ahmadinejad, though a highly informed analyst says that Iran`s Leader, Ali Khamenei, will be able to control the backers of Ahmadinejad in the event of a Mousavi victory. But there`s no question that Iran is highly divided, and when the results are announced–probably Saturday morning–there will be a few days of tension before it`s clear how the voters on the losing side react. …
 
It`s even likely that Khamenei may have decided that Ahmadinejad has served his purpose, and that a more acceptable, more moderate president would better serve Iran`s broader interests. “When Bush was president, perhaps Iran needed a barking dog to response to the barking dog in Washington,” says one Iranian observer. “But now, with Obama, it“
s different.”
Mehdi Khalaji ved Washington Institute skriver om hvordan valget kan manipuleres.
 
Michael Ledeen er opptatt av nøkkelrollen Mousavis kone spiller, og spekulerer i at Khamenei muligens ønsker at Mousavi skal vinne:
Many months ago I was told that Khamenei was gravely concerned about the future of the regime, that he had concluded that there was so much hatred by so many people that it was impossible to continue to govern by repression, and that Ahmadinezhad’s aggressive domestic and foreign policy threatened everything that had been constructed over the course of the past thirty years. The people telling me these things were friends of Mousavi, and they accurately predicted that Mousavi was going to run, and that he would have surprising public support, something I would not have expected. They also said that Khamenei had encouraged Mousavi to run, precisely because he, the Supreme Leader, was prepared to grant greater freedom to the Iranian people and to normalize relations with the West.
 
It sounded unlikely to me, but then Khamenei is gravely ill and reportedly uses large quantities of opium to ease the pain of an incurable cancer.  …
 
One possible indicator that Khamenei favors Mousavi is the absence of the security forces in the streets of Tehran.  Normally, demonstrators chanting “Death to the regime of lies” would be clubbed and beaten on the spot. That is not happening these days. …
 
I think there’s a good chance of violence, starting Friday night. I don’t think either side is likely to take defeat gracefully. At that point, those security forces who have been so notably absent in recent days will almost certainly reappear, and attempt to reimpose “order” of the sort the demonstrations have been aimed against. The security forces have the guns, the chains, and the torture cells on their side. In a showdown in the streets, the anti-regime forces have only numbers. But that might be enough. Gorbachev had the KGB on his side, lest we forget.  And yet, Soviet Communism ended feebly.
Revolusjonsgarden har gjort det helt klart at forsøk på å sette i gang en ”fløyelsrevolusjon” for eksempel fordi opposisjonen mener seg snytt for en valgseier, vil bli slått ned.
In a statement on the Guards` Web site, Javani drew parallels between Mousavi`s campaign and the velvet revolution that led to the 1989 ouster of the communist government in then-Czechoslovakia, saying some extremist (reformist) groups, have designed a colorful revolution … using a specific color for the first time in an election.

Javani called it a sign of kicking off a velvet revolution project in the presidential elections, and vowed any attempt for velvet revolution will be nipped in the bud. It also accused the reformists of planning to claim vote rigging and provoke street violence if Mousavi loses.
Er Mousavi virkelig en reformator?
American Enterprise Institutes Michael Rubin om Mousavi:
As prime minister throughout the Iran-Iraq War, he sought to ease Iran’s international isolation; however, he did this without seeking to compromise the Islamic Republic’s fundamental policy positions. Behind Mousavi’s soft-spoken exterior, he is a fervent revolutionary who purged the universities of Western-educated intellectuals and argued for an invasion of Israel. As president, Mousavi would be the face of the regime. He would not delight in antagonism as Ahmadinejad does, but he would not make the substantive changes to or compromises on policy that any real rapprochement will require. Domestically, he has painted himself as a reformer, promising, for example, to abolish the morality police that harass women showing too much hair and young men dressing in too Western a fashion. But, he really would have no control over security matters and so he would face widespread disgruntlement quickly. We would also see a resurgence of the vigilante groups (I wrote my first book about this phenomenon) who, in a manner analogous to Brown Shirts’, would rough up opponents to prevent implementation of policies of which their hardline bosses disapprove.
Con Coughlin i Daily Telegraph mener at valget uansett ikke vil spille noen større rolle, og at såkalte reformister skjønnmales.
Even the so-called moderate candidates, such as Mr Mousavi and former president Mohammed Khatami (who has now withdrawn from the contest), have been closely associated with some of the darker episodes in recent Iranian history. As prime minister in the 1980s, Mr Mousavi was a key ally of Ayatollah Khomeini, and actively endorsed his virulent hostility towards the West. It was under Mr Mousavi, for example, that Iran masterminded the hostage crisis in Lebanon, which resulted in Terry Waite and John McCarthy being held in captivity for five years.
 
It was during Mr Khatami`s two-term presidency that Iran made the most significant work on developing its atom bomb. This was the period when key nuclear installations, such as the underground uranium enrichment complex at Natanz, were constructed under strict secrecy. Tehran only stopped work on its military nuclear programme following the US-led invasion of Iraq in 2003, which persuaded Mr Khatami that Iran might be next on Washington`s hit list if it persisted with attempts to build a nuclear bomb. …
 
It doesn`t matter who wins this election, the bottom line is that it is highly unlikely it will bring about a significant change on the nuclear front,” says a senior British official, who is closely involved with the Iran negotiations. “Pursuing the nuclear programme is an article of faith for the regime, and not even a change of leader is going to alter that.”
If that is the case then the West cannot afford to waste any more time deliberating over how to resolve the nuclear crisis, when Iran is so close to having sufficient quantities of fissile material to build a nuclear warhead.
 
In the past, western policymakers have all too often clung to the hope that relations might improve if only they could establish a dialogue with the moderates. But as this election, and all the other false dawns of the past 30 years have demonstrated, there is little that distinguishes Iran`s moderates from its Islamic revolutionaries.
Bushs FN-ambassadør John Bolton skriver i Wall Street Journal om hvordan Iran vil svare på et angrep mot deres atominstallasjoner og gjennomgår seks ulike mottrekk:
Many argue that Israeli military action will cause Iranians to rally in support of the mullah`s regime and plunge the region into political chaos. To the contrary, a strike accompanied by effective public diplomacy could well turn Iran`s diverse population against an oppressive regime. Most of the Arab world`s leaders would welcome Israel solving the Iran nuclear problem, although they certainly won`t say so publicly and will rhetorically embrace Iran if Israel strikes. But rhetoric from its Arab neighbors is the only quantum of solace Iran will get.

Av: Jan Arild Snoen - 12. juni

Ingen kommentarer til “Valget i Iran”

  1. Eirik Steenhoff skrev 12. juni, 2009 kl. 00:00

    Takk for en informativ artikkel. Jeg må si at jeg er svært spent på valgresultatet. Dette er utvilsomt årets viktigste valg (ja, det norske stortingsvalget inklusive!), og hele verden har sitt fokus rettet mot Iran. Spennende!Når det er sagt, synes jeg det har vært noe vanskelig å forholde meg til IRANSKE medier i min leting etter informasjon om kandidatene, deres viktigste politiske saker, stemningen hos velgerne, etc. Iranske medier synes å være enten svært partiske eller rett og slett useriøse. Jeg har av en mangel på persiskkunnskaper kun lest de engelskspråklige nettutgavene, men disse var gjennomgående lite informative og virket uprofesjonelle. Har du lignende erfaringer med engelskspråklige iranske medier?Dette spør jeg fordi jeg anser det som viktig for en balansert vestlig dekning av det iranske valget at valgnyheter fra iranske medier blir videreformidlet (slik praksis ofte er når demokratiske valg i ett land blir dekket av nyhetsmedier i andre land). Men når ingen i Vesten – selv ikke grundige Jan Arild Snoen – klarer å få tilgang på en anstendig, internasjonalt orientert iransk nyhetskilde, mangler vi jo et viktig perspektiv i forbindelse med dette svært viktige valget.

  2. Jan Arild Snoen skrev 12. juni, 2009 kl. 00:00

    Iran har såvidt jeg vet ikke noen frie, uavhengige medier, og derfor baserer jeg meg på utenlandske. Dersom noen har tips til troverdige iranske kilder, tar jeg dem gjerne imot.

  3. E skrev 12. juni, 2009 kl. 00:00

    “Det hevdes ofte at presidenten ikke har noen makt, siden den ligger hos Den Øverste Leder Khatami.”Khamenei skal nok dette være. Ellers god oppsummering!

Skriv en kommentar

Vi forventer en sivilisert debattform uten personangrep. Minerva forbeholder seg retten til å fjerne upassende kommentarer.

Minerva
Minerva
Akersgata 20
0158 Oslo
post@minerva.as
RSSHent siden på RSS